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The concept of flexibility in the European integration process has been discussed in different ways
since the 1970s. Some forms may be “upwardly oriented”, representing a driving force rather
than a brake on the integration process. Others may weaken integration and have a
“downsizing” effect. “Enhanced cooperation”, which was first introduced by the Amsterdam
Treaty, aims to provide an attractive alternative to intergovernmental cooperation outside the
treaty, and to allow a group of Member States to deepen integration in particular areas without
affecting either the interests of others or the overall construction of European integration. The
Lisbon Treaty introduces changes at all stages of the cycle: preparatory stage, initiation,
authorisation, implementation, accession and termination. The conditions for enhanced
cooperation remain restrictive and other forms of flexibility may seem more attractive.
Consequently the prospect is for flexibility to be an empty promise rather than a trademark of
the new Treaty.
flexibility are analysed in the light of the decision-making
dilemma in which procedures are revised between a
sovereignty-led veto reflex and a functional drive for efficiency
(Hofmann and Wessels 2008). Given the restricted length
of this article, we will focus on the general procedure of
enhanced cooperation, referring the to special provisions
within Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) whenever this adds to the
line of argument. Our essential point is that the Lisbon
provisions for enhanced cooperation are hardly offering
an opportunity for an upward flexibility. It will therefore
remain an empty promise, rather than turning out to be a
“trademark” of the Lisbon Treaty.
Concepts of flexibility Concepts of flexibility Concepts of flexibility Concepts of flexibility Concepts of flexibility
There are various approaches aimed at structuring the
broad catalogue of concepts of flexibility. The “deepening
and widening” graph presented by Faber and Wessels
(2006) lays out a framework for visualising different
scenarios and strategies for future EU developments. Despite
its schematic nature, mirroring the heterogeneity of the
inputs to the debate on deepening and widening, it can –
in a slightly adapted version – provide a clear framework
for defining basic concepts of flexibility, both from a static
and dynamic perspective (see Figure 1).The impact on
European integration of these different concepts of flexibility
depends on whether the overall aims of integration are
commonly defined. Thus, concepts of “Core Europe”
(concept (a)) and “variable geometries” (concept (b)) can
Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
The idea of flexibility in the integration process has long
been the subject of European debate. The best-known
terms have been “Core Europe” (Schäuble and Lamers
1994), “avant-garde” (Chirac 2000), “centre of gravity”
(Fischer 2000) and “directoire” (Hill 2006), but these
represent only an excerpt from a broad catalogue of such
concepts.2 The debate dates back to the 1970s (Tindemans
1975) and has put forward different interpretations of
flexibility, depending on the approach and on the analyst.
In this contribution, we start from the general definition
that it refers to forms of integration in which one group of
EU Member States is not subject to the same Union rules as
the rest.3 The basic concern is why countries which are
objectively able and actually willing to proceed with further
integration in a particular area should be prevented from
doing so by others which are unable and/or unwilling.
Treaty-based flexibility can be identified whenever a group
of Member States proceeds in some such way within the
treaty framework. This does not necessarily have to be a
long-term condition but should ideally provide an incentive
for other Member States to join the “avant-garde” in due
time. In this sense, flexibility represents a driving force or
motor, rather than a brake on European integration.
This article will analyse more specifically whether the
provisions for enhanced cooperation in the Lisbon Treaty
constitute efficient procedures for flexibility. To this end, the
framework of different concepts and forms of differentiated
integration is outlined, and the Treaty’s provisions on
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be defined as upwardly-oriented flexibility. A “Core Europe”
merely represents a group of Member States that are
already able to attain the commonly-defined aims of
integration. Due to its inherent integration-driven dynamic
of a “re-invented Union” (Faber and Wessels 2006, pp. 14-
15), the remaining Member States will eventually join the
core in due time. Even though the concept of “variable
geometries” accepts that only some Member States will
form a fully-integrated core group, while others may decide
to permanently choose lesser integration, flexibility is still
upwardly oriented.
However, flexibility can develop disintegration or “spill-
back” effects whenever “matter” – that is, the very substance
of the policy area concerned as compared to the timing or
scope of participation – becomes the predominant variable
of integration (Stubb 1996), at the expense of commonly-
defined overall objectives of integration, resulting in highly
differentiated forms of functional cooperation emerging
from the EU 27. Hence an intergovernmental cooperation
of only a few large Member States (EU3; EU6) forming a
“Directoire” (concept (c)) may extend the scope and level of
cooperation substantially in specific policy areas, while
neglecting other matters and members. The concept of
“Europe à la carte” (concept (d)) offers a broad range of
subject areas from which each Member State can choose
the preferred menu, which suits its ability and willingness.4
Without the definition of a
common integration frame-
work, “Europe à la carte”
neglects deepening, per se,
and hence is also referred to
as “downsizing flexibility”
(Wessels and Jantz 1997, p.
348).
The basic dilemma result-
ing from flexibility is that
modes of differentiated
integration need to take
account of objectives defined
by a smaller group of able
and willing Member States
(“ins”) while ensuring that
the overall construction of
European integration and the
interests of the Member
States not included (“outs”)
remain unaffected. The
desired effect of flexibility can
thus be defined as tackling
the threat of dissolution of
the current state of European
integration and preventing a “downsizing flexibility”.
To that end, three forms of flexibility5 have been
introduced in the EU’s legal framework (concepts (a) and
(e)):
1) Predefined flexibility, which makes possible partial
integration within a specific subject area by precisely
defining the objective and scope, as well as the
participating Member States. While the European
Monetary Union can be perceived as one of the prime
examples, there are various other examples of
predefined flexibility established in protocols and
declarations, mainly in relation to JHA (e.g. Schengen).
2) Case-by-case flexibility, which enables Member States
to abstain from a decision without vetoing it, thereby
accepting that the decision is legally binding for the
other EU Member States. This constructive abstention
is only applicable within the intergovernmental CFSP.6
3) Enabling clauses, which provide a procedure for a
smaller group of interested Member States to proceed
within a clearly defined framework of given structures,
as in the case of enhanced cooperation complemented
by permanent structured cooperation.7
Enhanced cooperation – a treaty-based flexibility Enhanced cooperation – a treaty-based flexibility Enhanced cooperation – a treaty-based flexibility Enhanced cooperation – a treaty-based flexibility Enhanced cooperation – a treaty-based flexibility
arrangement arrangement arrangement arrangement arrangement
With EMU and Schengen representing cases in which some
Member States decided to withdraw from deeper collective
action, based on their cost-benefit ratio, flexibility is already
a reality within European integration. The latest example of
an opt-out is the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which will
be introduced into the EU’s legal framework by the Lisbon
Treaty, but which will not be fully applicable to Poland and
the UK (Protocol No.30). Thus, treaty-based arrangements
for predefined flexibility have already been used, and have
effectively contributed to preventing stagnation in the
integration process in specific EU policies. Other treaty-
based arrangements such as case-by-case flexibility and
enabling clauses have not yet been used. Moreover, they
have been challenged by options for further integration
outside the EU’s legal
framework. In May 2005,
seven EU Member States
signed the Treaty of Prüm
on extended data exchange
and intensified cooperation
against terrorism. Even
though the scope and
objective of this agreement
would have complied with
the requirement of the Nice
Treaty that “[enhanced
cooperation] must remain
within the limits of the powers
of the Union or of the
Community and does not
concern the areas which fall
within the exclusive compet-
ence of the Community”,
this procedure did not
represent an option, be-
cause the threshold of eight
interested Member States
was not reached.8 Thus, the
Treaty of Prüm can be
regarded as an enhanced cooperation outside the EU
Treaty, with the clearly defined aim to be eventually
transferred into the EU’s legal framework (Kietz and Maurer
2006).
Whenever EU Member States have the choice between
perfect and no communitarisation within the treaty
framework, rather than between perfect and imperfect
communitarisation, they are tempted to opt for models of
intergovernmental cooperation outside the EU. While these
forms of flexibility permit further integration within a policy
area where otherwise stagnation might have prevailed,
compliance with provisions of the EU Treaties has to be
ensured. Moreover, the lack of democratic control outside
the EU’s legal framework represents a problem, especially
Concepts of “Core Europe”
and “variable
geometries”can be defined
as upwardly-oriented
flexibility... The desired
effect of flexibility can be
defined as tackling the
threat of dissolution of the
current state of European
integration and preventing
a “downsizing flexibility”.
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Figure 1: Concepts of Flexibility Figure 1: Concepts of Flexibility Figure 1: Concepts of Flexibility Figure 1: Concepts of Flexibility Figure 1: Concepts of Flexibility9
a. a. a. a. a. Core Europe (“Avantgarde”): Core Europe (“Avantgarde”): Core Europe (“Avantgarde”): Core Europe (“Avantgarde”): Core Europe (“Avantgarde”): functional and/or constitutional deepening by a group of „willing” and „able” Member States to attract
others to follow
b. b. b. b. b. Variable geometry:  Variable geometry:  Variable geometry:  Variable geometry:  Variable geometry: sectoral integration of different groups of Member States with opt-outs accepting that not all Member States might
join the fully integrated group
c. c. c. c. c. Directoire Directoire Directoire Directoire Directoire:  :  :  :  : intergovernmental cooperation between a few large Member States (EU3, EU5) excluding smaller states by definition
d. d. d. d. d. L’Europe à la carte L’Europe à la carte L’Europe à la carte L’Europe à la carte L’Europe à la carte: : : : : ad hoc groups of interested states (including more or less than the actual number of EU members) engaged in
limited functional or sectoral cooperation outside the TEU framework
e. e. e. e. e. Treaty-based flexibility:  Treaty-based flexibility:  Treaty-based flexibility:  Treaty-based flexibility:  Treaty-based flexibility: pre-defined flexibility; case-by-case flexibility; enabling clauses; thus enhanced cooperation(!!!)
f. f. f. f. f. Withdrawal by single Member States: Withdrawal by single Member States: Withdrawal by single Member States: Withdrawal by single Member States: Withdrawal by single Member States:         complete opt out of one or more Member States.
Source: own adaptation of Wessels, 2008.
with regards to a policy area as sensitive as internal
security. Thus, even though intergovernmental cooper-
ation structures outside the
EU have so far been designed
in terms of an upwardly-
directed flexibility, as prepa-
ratory stages to further
integration within the Union’s
legal framework (e.g. Schen-
gen, Prüm), the possibility of
a downsizing flexibility effect
cannot be completely ruled
out, due to the double
structures and lack of control.
Enhanced cooperation,
which was established by the
Amsterdam Treaty and re-
formed by the Nice Treaty, is
supposed to represent a
treaty-based flexibility ar-
rangement which is suffi-
ciently attractive to provide an alternative within the EU’s
legal framework. Thereby, it is to be perceived as a tool for
effective policy-making, rather than a tool for building a
“Core Europe” (see Figure 1 concepts (a) and (e)). The basic
aim of enhanced cooperation is to enable a group of
interested Member States to proceed within integrated
institutional structures, under rather strict conditions, resulting
in a temporary state of im-
perfect communitarisation
with the inherent option for
eventually achieving the
state of perfect communitari-
sation, due to its openness
to other Member States.
Various reasons for the
non-use of enhanced coop-
eration have been dis-
cussed. On the one hand it
is argued that the mere
existence of this procedure
serves its own purpose,
because in sensitive policy
areas especially (where
unanimity prevails) the
“threat” of moving forward
within a smaller group of
Member States might lead to consensus and hence develop
an upwardly directed flexibility effect. On the other hand,
conditions for triggering enhanced cooperation and
provisions regarding the procedure are perceived to be too
strict to be applicable. Thus, the respective treaty provisions
Enhanced cooperation
supposed to represent a
treaty-based flexibility
arrangement which is
sufficiently attractive to
provide an alternative
within the EU’s legal
framework.
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have been reformed with every treaty revision ever since its
introduction into the legal framework by the Amsterdam
Treaty. These revisions can only be subject to speculative
consideration, since the procedure has yet to be triggered.
This also applies to the latest treaty revision in 2007.
The flexibility check for the differentiated policy cycle The flexibility check for the differentiated policy cycle The flexibility check for the differentiated policy cycle The flexibility check for the differentiated policy cycle The flexibility check for the differentiated policy cycle
after Lisbon after Lisbon after Lisbon after Lisbon after Lisbon
In the following, the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty are
analysed within the framework of the differentiated policy-
making cycle of preparatory stage, initiation, authorisation,
implementation, accession and termination (see Figure 2
below).
a) a) a) a) a) Preparatory stage: merely slightly revised conditions Preparatory stage: merely slightly revised conditions Preparatory stage: merely slightly revised conditions Preparatory stage: merely slightly revised conditions Preparatory stage: merely slightly revised conditions
Conditions for triggering enhanced cooperation remain
restrictive, according to the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty.10
Building enhanced cooperation is only possible “within the
framework of the Union’s non-exclusive competences”11
and it has to “comply with the treaties and the law of the
Union”.12 Moreover, the aim shall be to “further the
objectives of the Union, protect its interests and reinforce its
integration process”.13 In this way, undermining the internal
market or economic, social and territorial cohesion,
discrimination in trade and distortion of competition between
Member States are to be prevented.14 While enhanced
cooperation can make use of common institutions and
exercise competences, by applying the relevant provisions
of the treaties,15 the competences, rights and obligations of
the “outs” are to be respected.16 Enhanced cooperation
shall not become an exclusive club, and hence the provisions
of the Lisbon Treaty continue to demand that cooperation
remains “open at any time to all Member States”.17
Furthermore, the Commission and the “ins” are asked to
promote participation.18
Only the “last resort” condition and the threshold for the
minimum of participating Member States have been
reformed by the Lisbon Treaty. Provisions of the Nice Treaty
stipulated its use only when the objectives of such cooperation
could not be achieved within a reasonable period by
applying the relevant provisions of the treaties, without
specifying by whom and how this should be measured. This
“last resort” principle has been watered down by the Lisbon
Treaty by stating that the “last resort” can be established by
the Council19 (CEPS/Egmont/EPC 2007). Moreover, the
minimum number of Member States wishing to engage in
enhanced cooperation is set at nine Member States20
instead of eight. In terms of efficiency, there are various
interpretations of the most appropriate threshold for building
an enhanced cooperation. Nine Member States might
currently be considered reasonable, because within an EU-
27 this represents one-third of the Member States. Since an
enhanced cooperation is authorised to make use of common
institutions, the cost-benefit ratio will improve if as many
Member States as possible are involved (CEPS/Egmont/
EPC 2007, p.101). Thus, in view of an ever-growing Union
Figure 2: Enhanced cooperation in the Lisbon Treaty Figure 2: Enhanced cooperation in the Lisbon Treaty Figure 2: Enhanced cooperation in the Lisbon Treaty Figure 2: Enhanced cooperation in the Lisbon Treaty Figure 2: Enhanced cooperation in the Lisbon Treaty
P E
S M
a) Prep-stage
b) Initiation: prospective “ins”
d) Implementation by the “ins”
e) Accession of the “outs”
c) Authorisation by EC institutions
f) Termination
•  Council: Participating MS vote; outs deliberate but do NOT vote
• EP:  all  members
•  Passerelles: QMV & ordinary legislative procedure
•  Ins may use institutions & exercise competences by applying relevant 
  provisions of the Treaties
•  Acts adopted bind participating MS – no part of the overall acquis
Basic conditions: legal framework; relations to outs
[Art. 20 TEU; Art. 326-327 TFEU]
Council must have established the last resort
At least 9 interested MS
Submission of request 
defining scope &
objective of enhanced
cooperation
Info on
reasons
rejection
proposal
Com
Council
Nice Treaty
Rejection
failed
QMV
Approval
Enhanced co-
operation
Referral in case of
national interest
EC
Consent
Approved: transitional
periods if needed
Com
Conditions fulfilled
Conditions not fulfilled
referral
MS Council
Participating MS
QMV
Council
notification
Interested MS
Conditions not fulfilled
Within 4
months
Ongoing partial-acquis or accession of all MS
Approval
Proposal
transitional measures
Re-examination
Approved: transitional
periods if needed
Indication of measures
& new deadlines
Com
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it might have been preferable to define the threshold in
relation to the overall number of EU Member States,
keeping the ratio of Member States necessary for building
enhanced cooperation stable. For this reason, even though
there is currently no difference between the threshold of
nine Member States (Lisbon Treaty) and one-third of the
overall number of Member States (Constitutional Treaty),
the latter might have been more efficient in the longer-term
perspective.
b) b) b) b) b) Initiation: self-defined scope and objectives via a Initiation: self-defined scope and objectives via a Initiation: self-defined scope and objectives via a Initiation: self-defined scope and objectives via a Initiation: self-defined scope and objectives via a
supranational mediator supranational mediator supranational mediator supranational mediator supranational mediator
According to Article 329(1) TFEU, “Member States wishing
to establish enhanced cooperation between themselves
[…] shall address a request to the Commission, specifying
the scope and objectives of the enhanced cooperation
proposed.” This means that the request is not submitted
directly to the Council, but to the European Commission,
“which submits the proposal to the Council to that effect”21
– preserving supranational review. If the Commission does
not submit a proposal to the Council, it is requested to
inform the respective Member States of the reasons. Thus,
even though interested Member States are able to define
the scope and objectives of an enhanced cooperation, the
Commission remains the only gateway for launching a
concrete legal text.
c) c) c) c) c) Authorisation: emergency brake and accelerator Authorisation: emergency brake and accelerator Authorisation: emergency brake and accelerator Authorisation: emergency brake and accelerator Authorisation: emergency brake and accelerator
Revisions of the procedure to authorise enhanced
cooperation have been remarkable. The Nice Treaty
established an “emergency
brake” in case enhanced
cooperation is vetoed in the
Council and special national
interest exists, providing
Member States the possibility
of referring the matter to the
European Council for con-
sensus-driven deliberations.
The Lisbon Treaty communi-
tarised the procedure to
authorise enhanced cooper-
ation by abolishing this
opportunity and introducing
qualified-majority voting
(QMV) to all areas except
CFSP, where decisions are
now to be taken by unanim-
ity.22
Within specific policy
areas of the Lisbon Treaty,
special options are provided.
If one Member State vetoes a
decision on police and judicial cooperation in criminal
matters, and at least nine Member States wish to proceed,
“enhanced cooperation […] shall be deemed to be granted
and the provisions on enhanced cooperation shall apply”.23
In this case, the functional drive for efficiency transforms an
emergency-brake veto by one or more Member States into
an accelerator for smaller groups of “ins”.
Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty increased the European
Parliament’s (EP) rights of participation in the authorisation
procedure. While according to the provisions of the Nice
Treaty the EP was asked for consent only in areas where
“co-decision” applied, its consent with simple majority will
additionally be required under the Lisbon provisions in
areas where special legislative procedures apply.24 Thus in
general, the procedure to authorise enhanced cooperation
has been communitarised in terms of an increase in
participation rights of the EP, closely linking the emergency
brake to an accelerator and the application of QMV.
Nevertheless, the efficiency of the latter remains subject to
the suspensive sovereignty-led veto reflex provided by the
so-called “Ioannina” clause. That is, a group representing
at least three-quarters of the share of population necessary
for building a blocking minority can ask the Council to do
everything in its power, within a reasonable period of time,
to reach a satisfactory solution. This opens up the possibility
of pulling a “hidden emergency brake” at least for a limited
period.
d) d) d) d) d) Implementation: enhanced cooperation a moving Implementation: enhanced cooperation a moving Implementation: enhanced cooperation a moving Implementation: enhanced cooperation a moving Implementation: enhanced cooperation a moving
target target target target target?
Decisions taken in the Council within enhanced cooperation
are to be taken only by the “ins”, while the “outs” are
granted the right to participate in deliberation on the
decisions but not to vote. This implies that some sort of “mini
acquis” – legally binding only for the Member States
engaged in enhanced cooperation25 – is being created
within the overall acquis communautaire. This is especially
interesting with regard to Art. 333 TFEU which offers two
passerelle clauses: Member States engaged in enhanced
cooperation are enabled to transform unanimity into QMV
and to introduce the ordinary legislative procedure in cases
where special legislative procedures are foreseen. This
might render enhanced
cooperation a moving target
for those Member States
wishing to accede to it at a
later stage – having to apply
the mini-acquis in its entirety,
without any direct influence
on its scope. Indirect influ-
ence is possible via the
European Parliament, where
all members are entitled to
vote in cases in which the
ordinary legislative proced-
ure is applied or consent is
requested. However, the EP’s
influence is rather limited
with regards to the passerelle
clauses, being only con-
sulted when the ordinary
legislative procedure is to
be introduced. Nevertheless,
in view of the Commission’s
right to propose legal acts,
the EP’s (limited) right to participate and the judicial control
by the European Court of Justice, Community control is
granted to a certain extent.
e) e) e) e) e) Accession: Commission and Council of the “ins” as Accession: Commission and Council of the “ins” as Accession: Commission and Council of the “ins” as Accession: Commission and Council of the “ins” as Accession: Commission and Council of the “ins” as
door openers door openers door openers door openers door openers
In general, the procedure for accession of former “outs” to
enhanced cooperation in the Lisbon Treaty has remained
unchanged. The Commission is responsible for evaluating
and deciding on any accession request “within four months
of the date of receipt of the notification”.26 This supranational
control ensures that the interests of the EU as a whole are
In general, the procedure
to authorise enhanced
cooperation has been
communitarised in terms of
an increase in participation
rights of the EP , closely
linking the emergency
brake to an accelerator and
the application of qualified-
majority voting.
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preserved and that coherence with the legal framework is
provided. However, “outs” are explicitly requested to comply
“with any conditions of participation laid down by the
authorising decision”.27 The provisions lack specification as
to whether these conditions were initially defined by the
Member States submitting the request for establishing an
enhanced cooperation or by the Council deciding on its
authorisation. Thus, if the former applied, the “ins” would
have an influence on the accession of the “outs” by
predefining the conditions. Furthermore, the procedure for
accession in the Lisbon Treaty is extended in the event that
a request for accession is rejected twice by the Commission:
Member States then have the right to refer the request to the
Council comprising only the “ins”.28 Therefore, the decision
of the Commission can be overruled by the small group of
participating Member States by QMV29 and the “ins”
become a second door-opener.
f) f) f) f) f) Termination: enduring “mini acquis” or acquis Termination: enduring “mini acquis” or acquis Termination: enduring “mini acquis” or acquis Termination: enduring “mini acquis” or acquis Termination: enduring “mini acquis” or acquis
communautaire communautaire communautaire communautaire communautaire?
Even though the accession of all EU Member States is not
the explicit objective of enhanced cooperation, it is not
excluded in a long-term perspective. In the meantime, the
mini-acquis can provide an efficient tool for differentiated
policy-making in the respective policy area in terms of a
“multi-speed Europe”. Once it has been triggered, it
represents a state of imperfect communitarisation,
preventing a stagnation of integration. In line with the
argument that flexibility represents a motor rather than a
brake to European integration, this state will only be of
temporary nature. However, even if the “mini-acquis” was
of an enduring nature, in terms of “variable geometries”,
this form of flexibility would not develop a disintegration
impact, because the general acquis communautaire
persisted.
Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions
The reforms put forward by the Lisbon Treaty will not
necessarily make enhanced cooperation less complex, and
the sovereignty-led veto reflex has not been outweighed by
the functional efficiency drive. In particular the remaining
strict conditions for triggering enhanced cooperation will
not make the procedure more applicable. Thus, it will
continue to be challenged by other treaty-based
arrangements for flexibility, such as opting-out or predefined
forms of cooperation. Furthermore, the choice between
imperfect and no communitarisation will remain prominent,
thus maintaining the attractiveness of intergovernmental
cooperation outside the treaty framework. For reasons of
complexity, and given the existence of other, more attractive,
flexibility options, it will be difficult for this kind of treaty-
based flexibility arrangement to develop an upward flexibility
effect, despite the revisions of the treaty provisions on
enhanced cooperation at all stages of the differentiated
policy-making cycle. It is more likely to remain an empty
promise than to become a trademark of the Lisbon Treaty.
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NOTES NOTES NOTES NOTES NOTES
1 The University of Cologne leads the EU-CONSENT Network
of Excellence. Funda Tekin is Project Manager, and Professor
Wolfgang Wessels is the Coordinator.
2 For an overview on the complexity of terminology see Stubb
1996.
3 In line with this general definition, the terms “flexibility” and
“differentiated integration” will be used synonymously.
4 This definition of the pick-and-choose character of “Europe à
la carte” is based on Dahrendorf 1979.
5 For a more detailed description of these three modes see
Deubner 2000, Missiroli 2000.
6 Art. 31 TEU.
7 Arts. 20 and 46 TEU; Arts. 326-333 TFEU.
8 Former Art. 43(d) and (g) TEU.
9 While the horizontal x-axis denotes the number of Member
States, the vertical y-axis indicates the dichotomy between
sovereignty of Member States and the autonomy/supremacy
of the EU-level. What can be seen as 'integrationist' should be
seen as an upward movement along the y-axis and vice versa.
10 Conditions in the Lisbon Treaty for building enhanced
cooperation within CFSP have been simplified by abolishing
the definition of specific aims and the restriction to specific
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actions. Thus, enhanced cooperation is extended to the entire
field of CFSP and CSDP – permanent structured cooperation
being introduced to the latter (Art. 20 TEU; Art. 326-334 TFEU;
Art. 46 TEU).
11 Art. 20(1) TEU.
12 Art. 326 TFEU.
13 Art. 20(1) TEU
14 Art. 326 TFEU.
15 Art. 20(1) TEU.
16 Art. 327 TFEU.
17 Art. 20(1) TEU.
18 Art. 328(2) TFEU.
19 Art. 20(2) TEU.
20 Art. 20(2) TEU.
21 Art. 329(1) TFEU.
22 Art. 329(2) TFEU.
23 Arts. 82, 83, 86 and 87 TEU.
24 Art. 329(1) TFEU.
25 Art. 330 TFEU.
26 Art. 332(1) TFEU.
27 Art. 328(1) TFEU.
28 Art. 331(1) TFEU.
29 Art. 330 TFEU.